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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of Appellant Tyler Clapp's petition for 
post-conviction relief The order of summary dismissal should be reversed in part because the 
court dismissed all of the fifth cause of action and part of the first cause of action on grounds not 
raised by the state in its motion for summary disposition without giving Mr. Clapp any prior 
notice of its intent to dismiss on those bases. Further, the fifth cause of action is clearly 
meritorious. 
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts 
Mr. Clapp filed a pro se petition for post conviction relief challenging the district court's 
decision to revoke probation and impose a slightly reduced sentence. R 4. He attached 
transcripts from the probation revocation proceedings to the petition. R 16; 20-33. He attached 
an affidavit from his father, Christopher Clapp, as well as documents from the underlying 
criminal case and some medical records. R 18; 34-37. And he also filed his own Affidavit of 
Facts in Support of Post Conviction Relief. R 45-46. 
The respondent answered the petition and later moved for summary disposition. R 48; 
65. Attached to the respondent's brief in support of its motion was a copy of the judgment in the 
underlying criminal case (R 109), a copy of the Statement of Defendant's Rights in Felony Case 
(R 112), and a copy of the probation violation report (R 76-80). The respondent also attached a 
copy of the transcript from the October 20, 2011, probation violation hearing (R 93-106) and the 
November 10, 2011, probation violation dispositional hearing in the underlying criminal case. R 
81-90. Finally, the respondent attached a copy of the unpublished Court of Appeals opinion from 
the direct appeal. R 107-108. 
Mr. Clapp moved for the appointment of counsel (R 116), but also filed a timely response 
to the respondent's motion to dismiss. R 124 (Styled as a "Motion to Dismiss State's Motion for 
Summary Disposition"). Attached to that pleading was a copy of the SAPD brief from the 
sentencing appeal in his case. R 134-139. The Court appointed counsel and stayed proceedings 
for 30 days "to enable appointed counsel to familiarize him/herself with the case and to prepare 
any amended petition or amended briefs as appropriate." R 146. Counsel filed an Amended 
Petition. R 200. 
The Amended Petition alleged five causes of action which are set forth in the left column 
in the table below. Relevant to this appeal, Mr. Clapp argued that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for not seeking a mental health examination and for not providing mental health 
records to the court before the dispositional hearing. R 201. He also argued that appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the court violated Mr. Clapp's due process rights 
by considering unreliable evidence at the dispositional hearing. R 205. 
The respondent filed an Answer generally denying each of the five causes of action. R 
220. It then filed a Motion for Summary Disposition and a Brief in Support. R 225-226. It 
argued that the five causes of action should be summarily dismissed as set forth in the middle 
column in the table below. The Respondent also attached the report of probation violation and 
the transcripts of the probation violation proceedings as Exhibits A-C to its brief. R 237-252 
(transcript of admit/deny hearing); 253-257 (probation violation report); 254-267 (transcript of 
dispositional hearing). 
In response, Mr. Clapp argued that trial counsel improperly advised him to proceed to 
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disposition without a new mental health examination and that the reports from Nampa Medical 
Center, which were available to counsel, but not presented to the Court, showed the need for an 
updated evaluation. R 268-269. And he argued that his due process rights were violated when 
the court relied upon unreliable hearsay statements, i.e., the disputed probation violation 
allegation that he had been driving, which was dismissed by the state, and that his appellate 
attorney was ineffective for failing to raise that issue on appeal. 2 7 0-2 71. 
The court granted the respondent's motion without holding a hearing. R 274. It 
dismissed the first and fifth causes of action for the reasons shown in the right column in the 
table below. 
AMENDED PETITION MOTION FOR SUMMARY COURT'S RULING 
DISPOSITION 
1. Trial counsel was 1. This ineffective 1. Trial counsel was not 
ineffective for "fail[ing] to assistance of trial counsel ineffective for failing to 
properly investigate and should be dismissed because obtain an updated mental 
obtain evidence in mitigation "the Defendant had a Mental health evaluation because 
of the crime; to wit: mental Health Evaluation performed both trial counsel and Mr. 
health treatment records from a year earlier. ... The Clapp told the court one was 
Nampa Medical, and an Defendant acknowledged this not necessary. In addition, 
updated mental health and states that use of the prior Mr. Clapp informed the court 
evaluation that complied with Mental Health Evaluation that he had been suffering 
the requirements of Idaho was appropriate." R 230. from depression and that he 
Code 19-2524." R 201. had been treated for it. 
Therefore, the court had the 
information which the 
Nampa Medical records 
showed at the time of 
sentencing. R 280. 
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5. Ineffective assistance of 5. This claim should also be 5. Appellate counsel was 
appellate counsel for failing dismissed because there is no not ineffective for failing to 
to raise a challenge to the right to confrontation at raise a due process challenge 
district court's use of probation dispositional to the allegation that Mr. 
unreliable hearsay that he was hearings. R 23 3. Clapp was driving because it 
driving at the probation was supported by substantial 
violation dispositional evidence and the Court found 
hearing. R 205. it to be credible. 
Furthermore, there was 
sufficient unchallenged 
evidence in the record to 
justify revocation of 
probation without the 
disputed evidence. R 284. 
A Final Judgment was filed and this appeal timely follows. R 288; 290. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in dismissing the portion of Mr. Clapp's first cause of action, 
i.e., that counsel was ineffective for not providing mental health records to the court, on a basis 
which was not raised in the state's motion for summary disposition without giving Mr. Clapp 
twenty-days notice of its intent to dismiss on that basis? 
2. Did the district court also err by dismissing Mr. Clapp's fifth cause of action on an 
alternative basis which was not raised in the state's motion for summary disposition without 
giving Mr. Clapp twenty-days notice of its intent to dismiss on that basis? 
3. Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Clapp's fifth cause of action because the 
allegation that Mr. Clapp had been driving was not supported by sufficiently reliable evidence 
and thus should have been challenged on appeal? 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred by Dismissing a Portion of Mr. Clapp's First Cause of Action 
on a Basis not Raised in the State's Motion for Summary Disposition Without First 
Giving Him Twenty-Days Notice of its Intent to Dismiss on That Basis 
1. Facts Pertaining to Argument 
On October 20, 2011, Mr. Clapp admitted two probation violations. First, that on July 
27, 2011, he admitted that he drank beer on five or six occasions while on probation. Second, he 
admitted that he was intoxicated when he turned himself into the Ada County Jail on August 5, 
2011, for three days of discretionary jail time for that previous violation. R 242 (T pg. 5, ln. 7-
13).1 
Defense counsel told the court that a new mental health assessment would not be needed 
because one had been completed about a year earlier. R 242 (T pg. 6, ln. 2-14). The court also 
questioned Mr. Clapp about the need for an updated mental health evaluation: 
Q. Do you understand in this case those evaluations were performed slightly more 
than a year ago and that you have agreed that there's no need to update those 
evaluations? 
A. Yes, sir, I understand. 
Q. I know that you had to consult with Mr. Geddes with regard to that. I'm not 
wanting to make any inquiry into what conversations you had. But do you have 
any reservations you want to express to me about that? 
A. My drinking is -- I don't drink as much as I did when the evaluation was taken, 
and I'm now on medication. Those two issues I would think would [not2] reflect 
1 The transcripts from the probation revocation proceedings are included in the clerk's 
record in this case. Mr. Clapp cites to the page in the record where the transcript appears and 
also to the page and line numbers of the transcript. 
2 It is obvious from the context that Mr. Clapp is telling the court that the PSR would not 
accurately reflect the fact that he was now drinking less and was on medication. Mr. Clapp either 
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accurately in the older PSI. That's my only issue that I have with it. 
Q. Who were you treating with? Terry Reilly? 
A. Terry Reilly Clinic, Dr. Shane Vlcek. 
Q. And is that over in-
A. That's here in Boise. 
Q. If requested to do so, would you sign a waiver to obtain those treatment 
records so that we could have those in the presentence report, or you could 
provide them to your attorney so that he could supplement the record with those 
treatment records? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. All right. If you wish to do that, then, the court would have no objection to that 
information being provided to assist the court in sentencing. All right? 
A. All right. 
R 243-44 (T pg. 12, ln 15 - pg. 13, In. 22). 
However, trial counsel did not obtain the psychological records from the Terry Reilly 
Clinic. He did tell the court that Mr. Clapp "was struggling with unemployment and some 
significant mental health issues, which he has had for - on and off for awhile, mostly relating to 
depression. [il] As we know, alcohol abuse certainly exacerbates depression." R 263 (T pg. 7, 
In. 15-20). Counsel did note that Mr. Clapp "was working with a doctor to address his 
depression issues." R 263 (T pg. 8, ln. 18-20.) Along these lines, counsel argued that Mr. Clapp 
was "essentially homeless" for "a significant period of time" and "was really struggling" and 
concluded that Mr. Clapp's "life's circumstances ... did build up against him did take a toll on 
misspoke or the transcript is incorrect. Mr. Clapp alleged in his affidavit in support of his pro se 
petition that he informed appellate counsel "in writing that there was an error in the transcripts 
with regard to the PSI." R 45. 
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his mental health. And when he really started to get depressed and looked at his situation ... it 
was a pretty grim picture. And he admits that he had moments of weakness and began to drink." 
R 264 (T pg. 9, ln. 7-22). 
Mr. Clapp told the court that he had relapsed with alcohol, but had "decided to go see a 
doctor at the Terry Reilly Clinic. After some tests and stuff, he prescribed fluoxetine, that I am 
still on in the jail. Being on my meds improved my overall daily mood and mostly solved my 
self-medicating with alcohol." R 265 (T pg. 13, ln. 13-18). He continued, "[a]nd I think my 
medicines have helped and finally gave me a fighting chance to stay sober. I significantly 
reduced my drinking from almost daily last year to a handful of relapses this year. [1] And 
whenever I do get out, I am going to have my meds slightly increased and have no relapses. And 
I think that's the key to my sobriety[.]" R 265 (T pg. 14, In. 1-8). 
The court, without discussing Mr. Clapp's mental health issues other than to say that "I 
have got to think about more than just what's good for Tyler Clapp," reduced his sentence from 
ten years with three and one-half years fixed to ten years with three years fixed and imposed that 
sentence. R 265-66 (T pg. 15, ln. 7 - pg. 17, ln. 19). 
As noted above, Mr. Clapp alleged in the first cause of action of his Amended Post-
Conviction Petition that trial counsel was ineffective for his "failure to properly investigate and 
obtain evidence in mitigation of the crime; to wit: mental health treatment records from Nampa 
Medical, and an updated mental health evaluation that complied with the requirements of Idaho 
Code 19-2524." R 201. 
The state argued that this claim should be dismissed because "the Defendant had a Mental 
Health Evaluation performed a year earlier. ... The Defendant acknowledged this and states that 
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use of the prior Mental Health Evaluation was appropriate." R 230-1. The trial court dismissed 
the portion of the claim dealing with failure to request an updated mental health evaluation as 
follows: "Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain an updated mental health 
evaluation because both trial counsel and Mr. Clapp told the court one was not necessary. R 280. 
However, it went on to dismiss the portion of the claim relating to the failure to obtain medical 
records on a basis not argued by the state in its motion: "In addition, Mr. Clapp informed the 
court that he had been suffering from depression and that he had been treated for it. Therefore, 
the court had the information which the Nampa Medical records showed at the time of 
sentencing." R 280. 
2. Why Relief Should be Granted 
Here, the district court's reason for dismissing the claim that trial counsel should have 
obtained Mr. Clapp's medical records for consideration by the court was not raised in the state's 
motion. Therefore, the dismissal of that part of the first cause of action was sua sponte and 
without proper notice. 
2009): 
The applicable law is set out in Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514,211 P.3d 123 (Ct. App. 
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b ), the district court may sua sponte dismiss an 
applicant's post-conviction claims if the court provides the applicant with notice 
of its intent to do so, the ground or grounds upon which the claim is to be 
dismissed, and twenty days for the applicant to respond. Pursuant to I.C. § 19-
4906( c ), if the state files and serves a properly supp01ied motion to dismiss, 
further notice from the court is ordinarily unnecessary. Saykhamchone v. State, 
127 Idaho 319,322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995). The reason that subsection (b), 
but not section ( c ), requires a twenty-day notice by the court of intent to dismiss is 
that, under subsection ( c ), the motion itself serves as notice that summary 
dismissal is being sought. Id. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 7(b )(I) requires 
that the grounds of a motion be stated with 'particularity.' See De Rushe v. State, 
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146 Idaho 599,200 P.3d 1148 (2009) (reiterating the requirement ofreasonable 
particularity in post-conviction cases.) lfthe state's motion fails to give such 
notice of the grounds for dismissal, the court may grant summary dismissal only if 
the court first gives the applicant the requisite twenty-day notice of intent to 
dismiss and the ground therefore pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b). See 
Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 322, 900 P.2d at 798. Similarly, where the state 
has filed a motion for summary disposition, but the court dismisses the application 
on grounds different from those asserted in the state's motion, it does so on its 
own initiative and the court must provide the twenty-day notice. 
147 Idaho at 517, 211 P.3d at 126 (footnotes omitted). See also, Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 
523,236 P.3d 1277, 1283 (2010) ("Thus, where a trial court dismisses a claim based upon 
grounds other than those offered- by the State's motion for summary dismissal, and 
accompanying memoranda -- the defendant seeking post-conviction relief must be provided with 
a 20-day notice period."); see also Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 865, 243 P.3d 675, 681 (Ct. 
App. 2010) (Noting that if the court dismisses on grounds not presented in the state's motion, the 
petitioner has no opportunity to respond and attempt to establish a material issue of fact.). 
Although Mr. Clapp is not required to show he was prejudiced by the court's lack of 
notice, it is worth noting that he attached reports from the Nampa Medical Clinic to his prose 
post-conviction petition. The document confirmed that he had been prescribed fluoxetine for 
depression. Further, the medical report noted that Mr. Clapp's scoring on the PHQ-9 "suggests 
major depression."3 It went on to note that his "[t]otal score is 15. Warrants treatment for 
depression, using antidepressant, psychotherapy and/or a combination of treatment. Scoring 
suggests patient's functionality is impaired." R 43. This document confirms what trial counsel 
and Mr. Clapp told the court at the dispositional hearing but also goes further because it 
3 Major depression is included in the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's 
definition of"Serious Mental Illness." IDAPA 16.07.33.15(d). 
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describes the severity of Mr. Clapp' s depression, suggests the lost of functionality in his day-to-
day life which helps to explain his relapse, and sets forth a recommended treatment plan. 
This Court should vacate that portion of the order of dismissal and remand for further 
proceedings. 
B. The District Court Erred by Dismissing Mr. Clapp 's Fifth Cause of Action on a Basis 
not Raised in the State's Motion for Summary Disposition Without First Giving Him 
Twenty-Days Notice of its Intent to Dismiss on That Basis 
1. Facts Pertaining to Argument 
Mr. Clapp's fifth cause of action was that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise a challenge to the district court's use of unreliable hearsay at the probation violation 
dispositional hearing. R 205. The state moved for summary disposition arguing that the claim 
should be dismissed because there is no right to confrontation at probation dispositional hearings. 
R 233. The court dismissed the claim for two reasons: 1) appellate counsel was not ineffective 
for failing to raise a due process challenge to the allegation that Mr. Clapp was driving in 
violation of probation because it was supported by substantial evidence and the Court found it to 
be credible; 2) there was sufficient unchallenged evidence in the record to justify revocation of 
probation without the disputed evidence. R 284. 
2. Why Relief Should be Granted 
The district court's reasons for dismissing the claim that appellate counsel was ineffective 
were not raised in the state's motion. Therefore, the dismissal of the first cause of action was in 
part sua sponte but the court failed to give Mr. Clapp the twenty days notice required under LC. § 
l 9-4906(b ). Therefore, the dismissal of this claim should be reversed under Buss v. State, supra. 
However, if this Court does not reverse for lack of notice, it should reverse because the court's 
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basis for dismissal is in error. 
C. In the Alternative, the District Court Also Erred in Dismissing Mr. Clapp 's Fifth 
Cause of Action on the Merits of the Claim. Mr. Clapp Presented a Prima Facie Case 
That Appellate Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Raise the Claim That the 
Evidence That Mr. Clapp was Driving was not Sufficiently Reliable to be Considered 
1. Facts Pertaining to Argument 
A Probation Violation Report was filed on August 11, 2011. The Report, written by 
probation officer Darla Maqueda, alleged seven terms of probation had been violated. The two 
terms relevant here are that Mr. Clapp had been drinking, which he admitted to at the probation 
violation hearing, and the allegation that Mr. Clapp had been driving, which he denied. R 77-78. 
Specifically, the report alleged that: 
On July 27, 2011, the defendant admitted to driving his dad's truck knowing that 
he does not have a valid license. He reported the last time he drove was on July 
13, 2011. When asked on other specific dates he has been driving, he could not 
recall, but stated it has been a lot. 
R 77. Mr. Clapp admitted to violating his probation by drinking and the state dismissed the 
other allegations. The agreement allowed the state to argue about all the allegations at the 
dispositional hearing. R 96 (T pg. 5, ln. 7-16; pg 6, ln. 21-25). After the admission to the 
probation violation, Mr. Clapp asked the court to set bond pending disposition. The state 
opposed the granting of bond arguing, in part, that Mr. Clapp's admitted use of alcohol combined 
with the information that "[t]he defendant has admitted to his probation officer that he has driven 
on many occasions" militated against the granting of bond. R I 00 (T pg. 21, ln. 12 - pg. 22, ln. 
7). Mr. Clapp's attorney responded: 
That in regards to those other allegations, my client denies them adamantly. I did 
speak to his father. His father seems to confirm his position on there that that was 
a falsehood. [if] Obviously, I don't know the answer to that question, but his 
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probation officer clearly thought he was driving or indicated that he admitted to 
driving, Tyler says that is not true. 
R 100 (T pg. 22, In. 10-18). 
At the dispositional hearing, the state asked that the sentence should be imposed and 
argued: 
And in reviewing the probation officer's report of violation ... he has admitted to 
her that he is driving again, last admitted driving on July 13th of 2011. In fact, he 
can't really recall the exact dates and times he has been drinking, but he has been 
driving his dad's truck a lot. So he's drinking; he is driving; and he is not taking 
advantage of the programming that this Court ordered him to do. 
Mr. Clapp continues to do what Mr. Clapp wants to do and that is to drink and 
that's to drive. And ifhe is going to do those two things, Your Honor, he is a 
danger to have in this community. And ifhe is a danger, he needs to have his 
sentence imposed. 
R 86 (T pg. 5, In. 19 - pg. 6, In. 20). The Court agreed: 
Every time you get intoxicated, and in terms of probation violations here, you 
didn't make CAP aftercare, and then driving in your father's truck regularly. 
Now, it is only one small step to driving the truck regularly and driving the truck 
intoxicated. You weren't supposed to be driving a vehicle. And you are putting 
not only yourself at risk when you do that, you are putting the public at risk as 
well. 
And it would be bad enough that if you just go out there and you get drunk and 
you drive and kill yourself, but if you kill some innocent third party, that's about 
the worse outcome you can have. 
R 88 (T pg. 15, In. 23 - pg. 16, In. 11). 
Mr. Clapp filed a Notice of Appeal from the order revoking probation and imposing the 
amended sentence. Mr. Clapp alleged the following about his relationship with his appellate 
counsel: 
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The Idaho State Appellate Defender in this case represented Petitioner on appeal 
in this case. The Petitioner informed appellate counsel that he wished to 
challenge the court's reliance upon evidence that Petitioner deemed unreliable in 
the Petitioner's Report of Violation, particularly the claim that he was "driving a 
lot" as reported by his probation officer. In addition to challenging the length of 
the sentence, Petitioner asked appellate counsel to challenge the sentence on due 
process grounds and for a challenge to the denial of his Rule 35 motion. 
Petitioner asserts that Appellate counsel advised him that he did not know too 
much about "due process" grounds for relief and failed to file any kind of an 
appeal except for an abuse of discretion. 
Petitioner contends that he has merit to his due process challenge under federal 
and state law. (See State v. Martinez, 154 Idaho 940, 303 P.2d [sic] 627 (2013) 
for due process overview of guidelines pertaining to use of hearsay at sentencing). 
Petitioner advised his attorney that he wished to pursue these claims, but his 
attorney did not provide effective assistance of counsel and waived these claims. 
R 182 (italics in original). 
And, in fact, appellate counsel did not raise a due process challenge to the court's use of 
the hearsay allegations that Mr. Clapp had been driving. According to this Court's Unpublished 
Opinion: "On appeal, Clapp does not challenge the district court's decision to revoke probation, 
but argues only that this sentence is excessive and that the district court should have further 
reduced Clapp's sentence upon revocation of probation." R 108. 
As noted above, the court dismissed the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel cause 
of action because the allegation that Mr. Clapp had been driving was supported by substantial 
credible evidence and that there were other reasons in the record to justify the imposition of 
sentence. That determination was in error and cannot be used to justify the dismissal of the 
claim. 
2. Why Relief Should be Granted 
A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the 
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Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has 
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the 
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). The Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee the right to counsel on appeal. Douglas v. 
California, 3 72 U.S. 353 (1963 ). This right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance 
of that counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,396 (1985). Idaho law also guarantees a criminal 
defendant's right to counsel. Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13; LC.§ 19-852. 
In general, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or 
federal constitution, is analyzed under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984), standard. In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's 
performance was deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional performance; 
and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. at 689. The prejudice prong of the test is shown ifthere is a reasonable probability that a 
different result would have been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. Id. An 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is judged under the standards set forth in 
Strickland. See e.g., Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656,658, 168 P.3d 40, 42 (Ct. App. 2007). 
Here appellate counsel's performance was deficient for failing to raise the issue that the 
evidence relied upon by the court in imposing sentence was not sufficiently reliable because it 
was much stronger than the issue actually raised in the appeal. While a sentencing court may 
consider information that would not be admissible at trial there must be sufficient indicia of its 
reliability. "[A] defendant clearly has a due process right not to be sentenced on the basis of 
materially false incorrect information. Due process requires some minimal indicia of reliability." 
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United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir) amended, 992 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993), cert 
denied 510 U.S. 1040 (1994); United States v. Jordan, 256 F.3d 922,931 (9th Cir. 2001). 
Similarly, this Court stated in State v. Dunn, 134 Idaho 165, 172, 997 P.2d 626, 633 (Ct. App. 
2000), that "a defendant is denied due process when the sentencing judge relies upon information 
that is materially untrue or when a judge makes materially false assumptions of fact." 134 Idaho 
at 172,997 P.2d at 633 citing State v. Gawron, 124 Idaho 625,627,852 P.2d 317,319 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
The factual findings of a sentencing court will not be disturbed on appeal so long as they 
are supported by substantial evidence. State v. Eddins, 156 Idaho 645,330 P.3d 391 (Ct. App. 
2014); State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882,885,292 P.3d 273,276 (2013). "Substantial evidence is 
such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Eddins, supra. Here, 
there was not substantial evidence for the court to conclude that Mr. Clapp had driven his 
father's truck. Mr. Clapp refused to admit that probation violation allegation and, in fact, 
adamantly denied that he had done so. Trial counsel told the court that he had spoken to Mr. 
Clapp's father (the owner of the truck) and that he seemed to confirm Mr. Clapp's position.4 The 
only thing before the court was the probation officer's report of violation which alleged Mr. 
Clapp admitted he had driven his father's truck, but Mr. Clapp denied making that statement too. 
Thus, a reasonable mind would not accept the insufficiently reliable hearsay allegations 
contained in that report as sufficient proof of the serious allegations contained therein. 
Further, the court's error in considering that evidence was not harmless. The state argued 
4 As part of the prose petition, Mr. Clapp's father provided an affidavit which stated: 
"During the time my son lived with me for several years. l never let him use my truck for any 
reason[.] To my knowledge he never drove drunk." R 18. 
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that Mr. Clapp's sentence should be imposed because he was drinking and he was driving. R 86 
(T pg. 5, ln. 19 - pg. 6, In. 20) ("Mr. Clapp continues to do what Mr. Clapp wants to do and that 
is to drink and that's to drive. And if he is going to do those two things, Your Honor, he is a 
danger to have in this community. And ifhe is a danger, he needs to have his sentence 
imposed."). Further, the court's comments at the dispositional hearing demonstrate that the court 
was mainly concerned with the possibility that Mr. Clapp would drive after drinking and possibly 
hurt himself or others. R 88 (T pg. 15, ln. 23 - pg. 16, ln. 11) ("Now, it is only one small step to 
driving the truck regularly and driving the truck intoxicated. [,0 And it would be bad enough that 
if you just go out there and you get drunk and you drive and kill yourself, but if you kill some 
innocent third party, that's about the worse outcome you can have."). Finally, the court denied 
Mr. Clapp's Rule 35 motion reiterating the concern for public safety. R 37 ("Furthermore, Mr. 
Clapp has also shown that he is not a good candidate for supervision in the community- even 
while on probation for a drinking related offense, Mr. Clapp continued to drink and to drive."). 
As demonstrated above, the due process issue is meritorious. Had it been raised on 
appeal, this Court would have vacated the order revoking probation and remanded for further 
proceedings because the court plainly relied upon the allegation as the primary basis for sending 
Mr. Clapp to prison. The failure to raise the issue on appeal was ineffective assistance of counsel 
under Mintun v. State, supra, and the court erred by summarily dismissing this claim. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Clapp respectfully requests that the order of summary 
disposition as to his first cause of action be reversed in part. He also respectfully requests that 
the order of summary disposition as to his fifth cause of action be reversed in toto and the matter 
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be remanded for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted thi~""f't of November, 2014. 
DL(,A~clB. ~~""-
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney for Tyler Clapp 
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